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Thirtieth Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

(This report covers the period from
12 September through 18 September 1973)

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.*

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19 September 1973
TCS No. 4354/73

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19 September 1973

Thirtieth Report

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS***

(This report covers the week from
12 September through 18 September 1973)

The Key Points

- No new infiltration of North Vietnamese personnel to the south was detected during the week, although an additional 75 non-combat specialists are scheduled to begin the infiltration trip in early October.
- The redeployment of another NVA rear services regiment to southern Laos, and the arrival of 1,300 tons of munitions at one of the major entry passes from North Vietnam into Laos, provide further evidence that Hanoi plans to resume the large scale use of the Ho Chi Minh trail during the coming dry season.
- The Communists have also made substantial additional progress in the past month in constructing and improving their major road corridors leading south from North Vietnam on both sides of the South Vietnam - Laos border.
- Combat activity was at low levels during the week in both South Vietnam and Laos.

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The Details

NOTE: This is the Thirtieth in a series of memoranda summarizing evidence received during the reporting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina. As with previous issues, we have prepared sections I and II of this memorandum in sterilized form in order to minimize the risk of source exposure if parts of the memorandum are used outside U.S. Government channels. For U.S. eyes only, we have appended a listing of specific sources to sections I and II at ANNEX A. Section III of the report has not been sterilized. Its contents should be held within the U.S. Government, and within the proper channels for material so classified.

I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies

A. Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments

1. During the past week, no new North Vietnamese combat troops were observed in the infiltration pipeline. Four small groups totaling about 75 civilian and military specialists, however, are scheduled to begin the infiltration trip to the south in early October. In the three-month period since the 15 June "second" ceasefire, over 7,000 North Vietnamese personnel--some three-quarters of whom have been combat troops--have entered the infiltration pipeline. Since the original ceasefire agreement was signed on 27 January, Hanoi has moved more than 57,000 personnel through the infiltration system. Of these, some 25,000 were already in the pipeline headed southward on that date and more than 32,000 began their trip subsequently. (ANNEX B, for U.S. eyes only, contains a more detailed discussion of the information pertaining to infiltration which was received during the past week.)

South Vietnam

Regular Combat Forces

VC/NVA ¹	RVNAF ²	VC/NVA	RVNAF
180,000	320,000	86,000	89,000

325th
324B
320B
304th
711th
2nd

MR 1
VNMC
Airborne
1st
2nd
3rd
Regional
Forces

1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat support, and air defense units and local force companies and platoons.

2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes assigned personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat support units, and Regional Force battalions. Although present for duty strength is no longer available, it is estimated to be about 85% of assigned strength.

MR 2
VC/NVA
RVNAF

32,000	68,000
--------	--------

320th
10th
3rd

23rd
22nd
Regional
Forces

MR 3
VC/NVA
RVNAF

36,000	75,000
--------	--------

429th Sapper
Command
9th
7th
5th


25th
18th
5th
Regional
Forces

MR 4
VC/NVA
RVNAF

26,000	88,000
--------	--------

1st

21st
9th
7th
44th Special
Tactical Zone
Regional Forces



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HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

2. A North Vietnamese administrative services regiment which handles infiltrators going south returned to southern Laos from the Central Highlands of South Vietnam in early September. The unit--the 574th Commo-liaison Regiment--had shifted to western Pleiku Province in late spring at a time when the regular North Vietnamese infiltration cycle was ending and the rainy season in Laos beginning. In other developments, the NVA 30th Engineering Regiment was detected moving from southern Laos to the area along Route 14 in western MR-1 on 5 September, bringing to six the number of engineering regiments operating in northern South Vietnam.

3. Together with recent evidence indicating the movement from South Vietnam to Laos of two transportation regiments (see last week's report), these redeployments indicate that the North Vietnamese plan to move men and supplies through the Laos Panhandle during the upcoming dry season, while concentrating their efforts in South Vietnam on improving the road network during the rainy season in that area.*

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies

North Vietnam

4. Substantial quantities of supplies were detected moving through Quang Binh Province despite heavy rains which again disrupted activity in the North Vietnamese Panhandle. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] over 5,500 tons of unspecified cargo were shipped south on barges in Quang Binh Province. Although the source did not report the composition of the cargo, most of it was probably foodstuffs, needed because of distributional problems caused by the heavy typhoon rains during the past few weeks.

25X1C

25X1C

* During October the northeast monsoon will begin to dominate the Indochina Peninsula, bringing dry weather to Laos and southern South Vietnam, and wet weather to much of northern South Vietnam.

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HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

5. Shipments of munitions were also observed moving south through Quang Binh Province. During the period 6-12 September at least 160 tons of ordnance were sent to a logistic unit in Quang Binh Province from a logistic unit in the Vinh area. Finally, units were noted preparing for another typhoon scheduled to hit North Vietnam shortly. On 13 September logistic units were reinforcing dikes and securing their storage areas to prevent water damage from the rains.

Laos and Cambodia

6. Most of the logistic activity noted in the Laos Panhandle continues to be associated with road repair and local resupply. Recent information, however, indicates that the Communists have begun to stockpile substantial quantities of munitions in preparation for the dry season transportation effort through Laos.

25X1C

(In recent months, of course, Hanoi has shipped thousands of tons of cargo directly across the DMZ and down the western supply corridor in South Vietnam, but very little of this cargo has been identified as ordnance. This suggests that the route through Laos--the Ho Chi Minh trail network--will be the main route used for military supplies during the coming dry season.)

South Vietnam

7. Brisk NVA logistic activity in northern South Vietnam continues the pattern of the past several months. The only cargo detected moving was rice, fuel, and construction material, suggesting that with the approaching rainy season in northern South Vietnam, the Communists will concentrate on upgrading their road network, maintaining their forces, and supporting the civilian population in these areas (see Section III, below). This type of activity was most evident along the Communists' new western supply corridor where on 6 September about 740 tons of

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rice, fuel, and explosives were reported moving to a major storage area in the A Shau Valley. Two days later on 8 September this storage area reportedly received over 225 tons of the same types of materials. On the same day, more than 115 vehicles with unidentified cargo were observed moving in the Khe Sanh area. Even larger vehicle movements were detected in northeastern Quang Tri Province where on 7 September over 500 vehicles were active.

II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South Vietnam and Laos

A. South Vietnam

8. In South Vietnam, the total number of communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January, 15 June, and for the last week (12-18 Sep) are shown below:

<u>Military Region</u>	<u>Total Since 27 January Ceasefire</u>		<u>Total Since 15 June Ceasefire</u>		<u>Last Week (12-18 Sep)</u>	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	1,260	4,408	235	1,049	15	81
MR 2	480	3,313	216	1,459	13	115
MR 3	536	3,783	134	1,207	8	42
MR 4	994	9,043	316	2,877	29	202
Totals	3,270	20,547	901	6,592	65(104)	440(611) <u>1/</u>

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.


9. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the charts on the following pages, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has

(See Reverse Side of Page)



CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1973)




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CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(1 AUGUST 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



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occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion.

B. Laos

10. Military activity in Laos remained at a low level during the past week.

III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military Capabilities in Indochina

A. Communist Road Construction in South Vietnam and Laos

25X1D

11. [REDACTED] the Communists are making substantial progress on their new major road corridors leading south from North Vietnam on both sides of the South Vietnam-Laos border. Along the Communists' new western supply corridor within South Vietnam, the gap separating the north and south sections has been reduced from 30 to 25 miles since 30 July, and some 30 miles of new dual lane clearing has been added to the southern end of the Pleiku-Darlac Province segment (see the map on the following page). [REDACTED]

25X1D

25X1D

[REDACTED] a new east-west road, probably branching off the north-south corridor, is under construction south-east of Duc Co. The presence of this road tends to support a recent report that the Communists plan to push across Route 14 south of Pleiku to move tanks, artillery, and other types of heavy equipment into Base Area 202. The report specified this October as the planned date of the movement, but given ARVN control of Route 14 and the heavy rains in this area in October, the Communists will probably be unable to implement these plans.

25X1D

12. In southern Laos, [REDACTED] the addition of 20 miles of road to the new Panhandle corridor, which now appears to be directed

25X1D

25X1D

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toward the tri-border of South Vietnam rather than due south into Cambodia. Construction is now under-way on 50 percent of this new road system, and should proceed more rapidly with the arrival of the dry season.

B. Communist Logistic Activities in North-
ern MR-3

13. Recent evidence indicates that the Communists are continuing to strengthen their hold over areas along the northern border of South Vietnam's MR-3 by further improving transportation and communications networks there. A rallier has reported that the Communists eventually intend to link their roads in this area with the new western supply corridor under construction to the north. At the same time, the NVA and Viet Cong are continuing to repair cross-border routes from Cambodia into northern Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces.

14. The Communists may also be building a large new communications facility in northern Binh Long Province. [REDACTED]

25X1C

25X1C [REDACTED] a station under construction there will be equipped with such modern equipment as a new 30-meter high antenna capable of transmitting messages to Hanoi without using relay stations. The station is to be completed by the end of this year, and is to be used for both military and civil communications. Earlier evidence had indicated that a large shipment of modern communications gear, including two 1,000-watt radio sets, arrived in northern MR-3 several weeks ago. Some of this equipment may be installed in the new station.

15. Other sources have reported that Viet Cong cadre in the town of Xa Mat in northern Tay Ninh Province have installed a small electric power plant to produce electricity for two rice mills, three saw mills, and civilian housing in the area of Route 22. The Communists are also continuing efforts to attract civilians to "liberated" areas by offering tax exemptions, loans, and food subsidies, and rear


services personnel have established markets to deal with traders from government-controlled areas. The Viet Cong in Tay Ninh claim that the flow of supplies to their trading posts is substantial and that they have successfully established economic relationships with numerous local GVN officials, troops, and civilians. To date, however, not many civilians living in GVN-controlled areas have seen fit to move into Communist-held territories.

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ANNEX A

NSA 25X3



Paragraphs 8 through 10: These paragraphs, which list reports of Communist-initiated fighting inside South Vietnam and Laos in violation of the ceasefire, [REDACTED]

25X9

25X9

25X9

[REDACTED] In the case of South Vietnam, they are almost exclusively derived from reporting of the South Vietnamese armed forces and may be subject to the biases inherent in RVNAF reporting at the present time. In the case of Laos, most of the reporting on combat violations comes from Laos Government commanders who pass the information to American officials at the Military Region Headquarters level. In any case, there is no particular security problem associated with using the information in these paragraphs in discussions with the North Vietnamese.

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ANNEX B

Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese
Personnel to the South

Four special-purpose infiltration groups totaling about 75 civilian and military specialists were initially detected in North Vietnam during the past week. These groups, which are to travel to the B-5 Front in the extreme northern part of GVN MR 1, are to depart on 9 October and reach their destination some two weeks later. Because these groups have not yet entered the infiltration pipeline, they will not be included in our estimate until October. Table 1, below, summarizes the southward movement of all North Vietnamese--including specialists--by month since January 1973.

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Table 1

Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline
Since 1 January 1973

	<u>Total^{1/}</u>	<u>Special-Purpose</u>
January	20,000	1,600
February	10,200	2,100
March	3,250	2,250
April	1,925	1,200
May	7,175	300
June	2,200	700
July	3,650	600
August	2,200	700
September 1-4	0	0
September 5-11	50	50
September 12-18	0	0

^{1/} Including gap-filled groups, except groups 7001-7009 and 5057. Assuming that these groups departed after 1 January, about 5,000 combat troops would be added to the infiltration starts shown above.

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